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Abstract -- The paper is a survey of the Filipino Nation’s effort 
towards nation building.  It highlights the socio-historical 
unfolding of the nationhood of the country -- Philippines.  The 
paper answers the basic question on what paved the way to the 
formation of the Filipino Nation and why it remains to be a neo-
colonial outpost to the US even in the 20th century.  It also 
provides reasons on how and why Filipinos had shaped the kind 
of institutions that operate the present state as it is now. 
     Using Comparative Historical Analysis (CHA), the paper 
elaborately accounts on what turning points served as the 
watersheds of nationhood to Philippine political history. 
Likewise it employs historical institutionalism as well as the 
new institutional economics.  It emphasizes on property rights, 
transaction costs, modes of governance, social norms, 
ideological values, enforcement mechanisms, and others that 
paved way to what Philippine politics and governance came to be 
as it is historically traced to its present formation.  
The study engages scenarios on what it had been in the past 
and what it might be in the years to come given the path that it 
has tread from colonial times to to its neo-colonial position at 
present. 
Keywords- Philippine political structure and culture; 
Subnational Politics; Filipino Nationhood; Formation of the 
Filipino Nation; Philippine Developmentalism 
I. Studies on Politics in Cebu
Extensive scholarly work has been done on Cebuano 
politics. These include the well-known edited volume An 
Anarchy of Families:  State and Family in the Philippines by 
Alfred McCoy.  The volume presents key sources on the 
dynamics of traditional political families, such as chapters by 
Michael Cullinane, “Patron as Client: Warlord Politics and the 
Duranos of Danao” (in McCoy 1998:163-243), and by Resil 
Mojares, “The Dream Goes On: Three Generations of the 
Osmeñas” (1998:311-347). These works explored specific 
cases that show the historical development of political 
structure and culture operating in Cebuano local politics and 
the role of political families. 
More discussions on Cebuano political dynamics can 
be found in the works of John Sidel in Capital, Coercion and 
Crime Bossism in the Philippines (1999), of Michael Cullinane 
in “The Changing Nature of the Cebu Urban Elite (1982),” of 
Alfred McCoy and Ed de Jesus in Philippine Social 
History: Local Trade and Global Transformations (1982), and 
of Concepcion Briones in Life in Old Parian (1983). 
Literature shows that Cebu province’s local political 
history consists of structural layers of supra-local or supra-
municipal organizations of patron-client relations, of machine 
politics, and of bossism. Prominent political leaders derive 
popular support from leaders of major townships, cities, and 
barangays who can promise and deliver to the patron the bulk 
of voters to ensure victory. This means that leaders who 
represent major political clans get support through a network of 
small town bosses that govern urban and rural communities.  
Sidel’s work (1999) Capital, Coercion, and Crime 
Bossism in the Philippines demonstrates the distinctive 
organization of Cebuano political settlement through web-like 
connections of small town, district, and provincial political 
organizations. It shows the interplay of political clans and 
political dynasties at the district, town, and provincial 
levels.  This arrangement also shows political compromise 
among elites as mechanism for them to accumulate proprietary 
wealth; where inter-familial, economic, and political 
competition has taken on a more paternalistic and less violent 
exchange and indicates how politicians rely on the skillful use 
of state offices and the construction of a political 
machine  (Sidel 1999).   
Cebu as an island local government unit is a dominant 
player in economic trade among island provinces and LGUs in 
the Visayan region. Cebu’s economic development can be 
traced to its history of class formation and land settlement that 
enabled its transformation from agricultural entrepot, an 
intermediary center of trade and trans-shipment, into a regional 
center of export industries at the turn of the 20th century (Sidel 
1999:81,128; McCoy 1998:7; Cullinane 1982:273).  
The dominant business and political clans, rich 
families or personalities of Cebu’s rural townships sustained 
themselves in power since the 1940s as they are mostly scions 
of pre-war local landlords and politicians. Sidel’s (1999) work 
also accounts for institutions of multi-tiered networks of small 
town bosses in cohorts with district patrons who collaborate 
with provincial patrons, who in turn also commit to national 
patrons. 
Furthermore, in Cebu City, the political and economic 
dynamics sustained electoral competition and capital 
accumulation of a network of Chinese mestizos who settled in 
the heart of the City such as the Parian District (Briones 1983). 
The political compromise agreement appear as a mutual 
development sponsored by a community of mixed Chinese and 
Spanish mestizos who dominated the island’s political 
dynamics and mode of political reproduction remained 
unchanged (Briones 1983). 
Tracing the history of people in control of political 
positions when Cebu City was still a Spanish ayuntamiento, 
Cullinane (1981) describes leadership at the local junta de 
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ayuntamiento as consisting of mixed ethnic composition: 
Spanish peninsulares, Spanish mestizos, chinese mestizos, 
immigrant Filipinos, and local Filipino families. All these 
groups were considered prominent residents.   
Most of these city councilors descended from families 
of landed aristocrats and held various occupations; some were 
lawyers, some held offices in the Spanish bureaucracy. 
Cullinane reported: 
“Between 1890 and 1898 some residents of 
Cebu served in the ayuntamiento. Twenty-
five of them were peninsular Spaniards (nine 
had lasting commitment to Cebu, of whom at 
least five were married to Filipinas), 17 were 
Chinese mestizos  (from 13 families), eight 
were local Spanish mestizos (four from the 
gremio de naturales), four were immigrant 
Filipinos, four were residents of San Nicolas, 
and only one was Cebuano from the gremio 
de naturales.  The councilors represented the 
wealthiest and most prominent families of 
Cebu City.  About half of them were 
merchants, but many of these had multiple 
occupations, usually combining commercial 
activities with some form of landholding. 
Twenty-five percent (25%) of the councilors 
were land owners, seven (11%) were 
lawyers, and nine or fifteen percent (15%) 
held (or had held) offices in the Spanish 
bureaucracy. (Cullinane in McCoy and De 
Jesus 1981:278) 
Cebu City, is the oldest settlement established by 
Spain in the Philippines. In the first half of the 20th century, the 
cities’ electoral contests were fought with intensity between 
elite factions or families and within families. Mojares (1986) in 
The Man Who Would be President, noted further that: 
“[A]t the very beginning of the century, 
elections were already marked by poll 
irregularities and political vendetta.  In the 
1903 municipal elections the returns from 6 
municipalities were annulled because of 
irregularities.  In the 1906 elections, the 
results of 25 of 41 towns were protested. 
Nine of those protested were subsequently 
annulled. A second election was held in the 
nine towns and again the results of three of 
these towns were voided.  Such was the 
passion of the Cebuanos for politics that they 
came to be regarded as  “the most politics-
minded group in the country.” In part, there 
was intense factionalism because political 
office in Cebu carried more prestige and 
bargaining power in national politics than the 
same office in lesser provinces… Moreover, 
the existence of media facilities in Cebu 
served to heighten the level of a factional 
intensity in the local sense.” (Mojares 
1986:34) 
Political Settlement in Cebuano Politics 
In the case of Cebu, literature suggests that political 
settlement is practiced among politicians especially in 
economic interests that are present in a combination of 
engagements in: (a) small town bosses; (b) district bosses; (c) 
provincial bosses; (d) political warlords; (e) political machines; 
(f) networks of patrons; and (g) electoral coercion.
Clans with large proprietary holdings in the province 
also dominate politics in their respective towns. Town 
executives from rich and powerful clans who own assets 
ranging from 300 to 500 hectares of coconuts and corn fields 
with a number of client tenants and farm workers hold power 
over Cebu’s municipalities.   
Agricultural landlords as well as leading personalities 
of organizations such as the Philippine Coconut Producers 
Federation (COCOFED) and others wielded political power 
over the masses. They commandeered business opportunities, 
such as owning or operating transport corporations, which 
monopolized ownership of buses plying provincial routes 
indispensable to commuters and inter-island trade (see Sidel 
1999).  
Small Town Bosses 
The pattern of rent-seeking activities shows the 
symptomatic practices of town mayors as small town bosses 
representing the interests of local elite families (Sidel 1999:86). 
As local chief executives, they possess regulatory powers. They 
control dispensation of government funds, influence the 
location of construction of projects such as roads, public 
markets, and schools (Sidel 1999:84).   
Town mayors also facilitated the employment of 
workers, award contracts, gain profits from overpriced projects 
or ghost projects, and payroll padding (Sidel 1999:84). Aside 
from this, their community control system includes the 
monopoly of franchise and permits for amusement centers, such 
as cockpits, which are granted as rewards to political allies who 
win in the local elections.  
These practices do not only demarcate the line 
between the allies and the opposition, they also serve the 
purpose of gaining more allies (Sidel 1999:84-85).  These 
practices have gradually expanded to other forms of bigger rent-
seeking ventures such as constructions of golf courses, 
residential subdivisions, and industrial estates (Sidel 1999:84). 
District Bosses 
Some political clans develop power over a district 
supra-municipal structure, which forms a “distinctive 
dichotomy between town and countryside” (Sidel 1999:101). 
District supra-municipal dynasties that hold power in densely 
populated local economic centers became host to monopoly 
capital in the local economy. These district political dynasties 
served as structures of political power established through 
capital accumulation and political machine building that further 
entrench political clans.   
These political dynasties positions in the political and 
economic rule sustain what Sidel (1999:102) refers to as “the 
coercive rather than clientelistic nature of production of social 
relations.” District bosses decide the type of campaign 
strategies during elections at the national level. District 
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dynasties were able to transform the networks of municipal 
empires into political machines, which serve as weapons 
against challenges to their dynastic rule.  
Sidel’s view has been substantiated by the political 
reigns of the Durano family in the fifth district of Danao City, 
the Martinez family of Bogo in the fourth district, and the 




 Early in the 20th century, the Osmeña family amassed 
the power of its political machine in the province. The Osmeña 
clan’s predominance was attributed to astute business 
management and political savvy. This is seen in its continuing 
political alliance with the sophisticated, organized dynastic 
mercantile class in the province.   
Sidel (1999:138) explained:  
“At the provincial level, the Osmeña family 
dynasty dominated the political and 
economic life of Cebu for most of the 
twentieth century.  It used its urban political 
machine in Cebu City and its alliances with 
major mercantile interests in the port 
metropolis to entrench itself over the 
generations. Unlike the congressional 
district-level dynasties in their bailiwicks, the 
Osmeña family never seized monopolistic 
control over the Cebu economy.” 
The Osmeñas’ strategy to implement an extensive real 
estate development made them known among Cebuanos as the 
harbingers of development on the islands. Gradually, they 
transformed their social and economic network into a political 
machine, which operates with or without voluntary support of 
national patrons.  
On this, Sidel (1999:138) noted: 
 “While not ashamed to promote family real-
estate holdings and other business concerns, 
by means of state resources and powers, the 
Osmeñas have been careful to identify their 
interests with those of Cebu City’s closely-
knit local oligarchy, whose cartelized 
shipping companies, copra and corn 
processing facilities, and manufacturing 
concerns have long benefitted from 
government largesse.”    
The pattern shows the powerful political clans are in 
an advantaged position to distribute, control, and dispose of 
public lands and ultimately gain control over the local 
economy. This economic control was further reinforced by their 
use of institutionalizing means. They enacted ordinances and to 
levy taxes, granted business permits, special licenses, public 
works contracts, and monopoly franchises (Sidel 1999;Mojares 
1986).   
                                                          
1 See, for example, reports on the case of Paulo M. Durano 
acting surveyor of the Port of Cebu in the Morning Times 
(Cebu City), December 24, 1968. 
Provincial political leaders also wield power to broker 
for local oligarchs given their control over state resources that 
could be used to advance the interests of the clan or their 
networks (Sidel 1999:124-138). Hence, “[a]lthough the Cebu 
City Mayorship became an elective post in 1955, the office 
retained these considerable powers over the local state 
apparatus” (Sidel 1999:129). Once this is established, the 
provincial boss can easily mobilize the political machinery that 
can muster massive votes for the family and its allied candidates 
in the local, congressional and national elections.  
This demonstrates the clan’s capacity to cater to the 
interest of the leading merchant dynasties and command 
support from local capitalist class by utilizing linkages of large 
and small businesses. In the process, this network of 
enterprising Chinese mestizos worked as a durable machine 
legitimizing the Osmeña clan’s leadership in the city districts 
and in the whole province (Sidel 1999:124-139).   
With the rise of the Osmeñas to power in Cebu and in 
national politics also came the gradual rise of Chinese merchant 
families, who mostly were part of business cartels that 
controlled inter-island shipping industry at the turn of the 20th 
century (Sidel 1999:132; Briones 1983; Cullinane 1982). 
 
II. Socio-cultural and Political Norms 
Warlordism 
 Warlordism became a form of leadership entrenched 
within a system of organized and armed goons, special forces, 
and control of law enforcement. They exercise  territorial 
control by means of intimidation, assassination, and corruption 
(Sidel 1999:106-107; Cullinane in McCoy 1998:169-170).  
Cebu’s warlordism was a political culture introduced 
during wartime politics. Ramon Durano, the patriarch of the 
clan in Danao City in Cebu was reputed to be the first Cebuano 
warlord while serving under the American forces during the 
Japanese occupation. In 1982, he reportedly gained monopoly 
of the production of paltik guns in Danao.  
Winning votes proved his professed loyalty to 
powerful local and national patrons. In return, his patrons 
granted him franchises and control over the local territory.  
They became a privatized familial empire (Sidel 1999:111-
112).  The same norm allowed Durano to install a number of his 
relatives and padrinos in government offices 1 , giving them 
many occasions for rent-seeking opportunities such as holding 
the office of customs collector, city tax assessor, and provincial 
fiscal (Cullinane1998). 
Machine Politics  
The concept of hegemonization according to Mojares 
(1998:322) is associated to the adage “leadership competence 
is what proves legitimate social power.”  The ethos of good 
service as good politics is shown in the competitive ability of 
the Osmeñas in the real estate business. It interweaves public 
benefit with private gain not only for their own family real 
estate enterprises but also to promote a norm of 
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entrepreneurship, developmentalism, and modernity among 
Cebu’s provincial elites and to neighboring island bourgeoisie 
(Mojares in McCoy 1998:322).   
 Bailiwick-building for the Osmeñas commenced at 
Parian— a mercantilistic community of Chinese mestizos. This 
enabling layer can be traced to the history of rivalry for political 
leadership among three racial classes, namely: (a) the native 
Filipino-Cebuanos; (b) the Chinese mestizos; (c) the Spanish 
mestizos of Parian, Lutao and Pueblo, Cebu since the early part 
of the 19th century (Briones 1983; Cullinane 1982).  
When he came to power, Sergio Osmeña, Sr. 
facilitated the entry of politicians in the rest of his clan. He used 
his political success to further expand his family business and 
proprietary fortunes.  In a classic case of elite dominance, he 
combined both political and business acumen to build a political 
machine characterized by neo-patrimonialism (Mojares in 
McCoy 1998:317). 
Patronage Networks 
 The padrino system in Cebu lends itself to the 
emergence of political preeminence through: (a) inter and intra 
familial social connectivity, affinity, and consanguinity; (b) 
loyal clients, patrons, or old political allies, and (c) friends and 
business associates.  This is a crucial system that aspiring 
politicians need to go through as they enter politics. 
  A classic example is the case of Ramon Durano, who 
initially joined politics supported by Paulo Almendras, mayor 
of the municipality of Borbon in the 1940s and blood relative 
of the Duranos (Sidel 1999:106). Almendras was allied with the 
Osmeñas at the time.  As he gained experience and influence in 
Danao (Cullinane in McCoy 1998:167), Durano honed his 
political savvy that enabled him to strengthen his political 
power by forging an alliance with provincial patron Mariano 
Jesus Cuenco.  The alliance was said to be forged to promote 
their interests in the Danao Coal Mining Industry as well as the 
Cebu Portland Cement Company (CEPOC) in Naga, Cebu.   
 Early in his political career, Durano practiced the 
“slide rule” scheme in maintaining an alliance with Cuenco who 
then headed the Bando Cuenco political party. Cuenco had 
linkages with Philippines presidents Manuel Quezon, Manuel 
Roxas, Elpidio Qurino, and Ramon Magsaysay who at different 
times served as his national patrons (Sidel 1999:102-107; 
Cullinane 1998:174-177).   
Learning the ropes from the Cuenco bloc in Cebu, 
Durano later grew more politically-astute and gained more 
power and control over Danao. Such power has further 
entrenched when he was introduced to President Carlos P. 
Garcia, a Boholano.  With the disbandment of Bando Cuenco 
in the 1950s, Durano established other local political parties 
called the “combines,” an aggrupation of Durano’s relatives, 
former members and allies of Bando Cuenco. His sons-in-law 
put up the Durano-Zosa-Dumon (DZD) combine in North Cebu 
and later the Durano-Calderon-Sybico (DCS) combine in the 
Southern part of Cebu (Cullinane 1998:172-178).   
 Durano’s ‘combines’ had its peak from 1957 to 1972. 
During this period, the clan enjoyed electoral victories in four 
provincial districts. It also mustered support from big 
politicians and landlords within the area of the ‘combines’ 
(Cullinane 1998:173-74).  The patriarch became the leader of 
the pro-Carlos Garcia voting bloc at the time after the Bando 
Cuenco disbanded. 
Coercive Electoral Schemes 
 Real politik appeals for consent from the 
ruled. Election has been designed as a mechanism to prove 
political power in whatever form or manner.  It is the feel for 
the game— called elections— that animate politicians to speak 
like actors about durability and legitimacy of their political 
dominance. Political dynamics carry various factors that serve 
as instrument of political governance and means of 
legitimation.  
Coercive mechanisms and electoral fraud were not 
foreign to Cebuano politics. Mariano Jesus Cuenco first used 
special policemen in the 1949 elections drafting notorious 
characters in a special force formed to provide armed support 
to questionable election campaigns(The Philippines Free Press, 
Nov. 26, 1949 as cited by Sidel 1999).   
In Danao, for instance, election fraud strategies 
included vote padding or inflating the number of voters, 
fabricated election returns, inflated registration listings, and 
school teachers who served as poll officials were used to 
facilitate fraudulent elections (Cullinane 1998:191-193).  
 In Cebu’s political history, various strategies were 
employed that made elections work to the advantage of small-
town bosses, district dynasties, provincial patrons, and national 
patrons. For favors that small-town politicians gained, such as 
the transformation of a rustic town into a City, votes were 
delivered to the benevolent patron in return. For example, 
Danao’s transformation into a city resulted in Cebuano voting 
“substantially for President Garcia” (Cullinane 1998:175). 
Consequently, the Duranos emerged as a force in the anti-
Osmeña bloc and rose as the dominant provincial politician in 
Cebu. This enabled the administration to sustain political power 
even after EDSA I (Cullinane 1998:185). 
 
III. Democratic Transitions and Early Reform Politicians 
Democratic transitions are taken from document 
review via comparative historical analysis (CHA). This method 
is crucial in tracing the characteristic origins of literature that 
tackle reform politics.  
It is a material necessary especially in tracing the 
social foundations of long-term growth of states with uneven 
levels of development in the past (Mahoney and Veblen 2015; 
Doner, Ritchie, and Slater 2005; Kohli 2004; Kang 2002).   
The crucial question, however, lies at tracing the 
origins of Philippine social relations. The debate in CHA, boils 
down to the role of more distal versus proximate causes, issues 
of historical consequence as premises of path dependence, case 
selections, and causal inferences from these documents. 
 Cumings (1984), in tracing the origins of the 
Developmental States (DS), suggests that colonialism is a 
“natural period” to start with. Using this premise, the paper ties 
up the colonial history of the Philippines and the wider debate 
on state formation of the Filipino nation. Furthermore, it also 
accounts for the historical continuum that shows how responses 
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from anti-colonial nationalist movements have altered the basic 
state forms inherited from colonialism.    
The series of movements that provide socio-cultural 
foundations for a Filipino state formation and reform politics 
can be traced back to the following: (a) recorded massive 
uprisings prior to 1745; (b) popular uprisings; (c) the 
secularization movement of the Filipino clergy; and (d) 
nationalist movements such as the propaganda movement and 
the Katipunan revolution, which were first to call for assets 
reforms and assets redistribution.  
It must be noted that before the Spaniards came, there 
was no centralized national government that connected all 
7,000 islands of the Philippines. It was the Spanish colonial 
government which attempted to create a semblance of statehood 
among islands.  
However, the connectivity among islands did not 
genuinely uphold modern democratic pinciples of transparency 
and open competition for government participation was not 
dispersed among the native citizenry. The Spaniards intended it 
to be so, knowing that their colonial interests would be in 
jeopardy if there was genuine unification among the Filipino 
people. 
 The formation of the Filipino nation commenced with 
the massive uprisings in the last two years of Spanish 
administration in the Islands (Veneracion 1987). Democratic 
transitions and reform movements in the Philippines are 
instructive of the patterns of uprisings at the start of Filipino 
nationhood after 333 years of Spanish colonial administration.  
 A crucial period of revolutionary uprisings took place 
from 1745 to the 1800s.  This was characterized by the natives’ 
defiance against the colonial power and its abuses and were 
abetted by growing anti-colonial and anti-feudal sentiments. 
These latter forms of uprisings were seen as: (a) the Filipino 
response to the land issues; (b) Filipino response against the 
colonial economic policies; (c) popular protest movements; (d) 
continuing challenges of Muslim Filipinos against the colonial 
administration; and (e) continuing challenges of the Cordillera 
People’s against the colonial powers (Constantino 1975:226-
345). 
 
IV. Turning Points in the History of Reforms 
First Turning Point: The Popular Uprisings 
Ileto’s (1979) Pasyon and Revolution: Popular 
Movements in the Philippines (1840-1910) and David 
Sturtevant’s (1976) Popular Uprisings in the Philippines both 
account for classic forms of resistance, which serve as catalyst 
to the country’s history of political transitions.  
This resistance have religious and political roots. 
Some theories also suggest that the root of uprisings also have 
a cult-like character based on folk Catholicism. Fanatical 
believers practiced, idolatry, kulam (native sorcery), magic, and 
mysticism.   
These practices also assigned symbolic identities to 
individuals such as Jesus Christ, God the Father, Mother Mary, 
and the demon as in Papa Isio’s uprising in Negros Island, the 
Cofradia de San Jose, or the Guardia de Honor.  
The practices made them believe that they were 
invincible. This thinking, in turn, emboldened them to resist 
perceived threats. Colonial control is one such threat to be led 
to resistance and uprising.   
In Phelan’s (1959) work The Hispanization of the 
Philippines: Spanish Aims and Filipino Responses, it was noted 
that missionary work was only effective at the urban centers or 
poblacion-plaza complex where the ancient Spanish rule 
imposed reducciones or reduction of communities into compact 
village arrangements within the reach of the church bells 
(Phelan 1959:72).   
Seventy percent of native population lived in 
peripheral communities. The religious missions were not as 
successful in their works in the mountainous areas and farms 
around the town peripheries because the rural folks were tied 
up to their land (Phelan 1959:75). Anderson2006) explained in 
Imagined Communities the religio-political instructions were 
left to the vague understanding among farmers and many 
village folks. Their belief was formed based on their 
imagination of the Catholic teachings. 
This is because farm homesteads were far from the 
Iglesia (church) and hardly received formal religious teachings 
from the Spanish missions from the town centers. And even 
though there was constant need of parish priests, Filipino priests 
were discriminated against holding parish posts. This was a 
privilege exclusive to the Spanish clergy.  
For the rural village folks, the only time they could go 
to church is during Holy Week, Corpus Christi, and for 
festivities of patron saints. This resulted to two types of 
Christians in the Philippines. One is that of the Spanish style 
Catholicism and the other is a distinctly Filipino folk 
Catholicism (Phelan 1959:88). 
Popular uprisings occurred prior to and after the 
Katipunan revolution. They continued during the American 
transition in the millenarian movements (Sturtevant 1976). 
Similar uprisings had sustained even at the turn of the 20th 
century from the end of the Filipino American War up to the 
administration of the American Bureau of Insular Affairs 
(Anderson 2006; Agoncillo 1990; Ileto 1979; Sturtevant 1976; 
Constantino 1975). 
The Second Turning Point : The Secularization Movement of 
the Church 
The Secularization Movement of the Church, was 
another crucial turning point for the development of progressive 
and reform politics in the Philippines.  
The clash between regular and secular clergies, during 
Spanish administration, was another root of radicalism targeted 
against religious institutions in the country. This conflict 
commenced with the episcopal visitation of parishes which 
were under the care of the regular clergy as early as the 16th 
century.   
Due to lack of secular priests in many localities in the 
early stages of colonization, the King allowed the regulars to 
assume temporary authority over the parishes. It was only in 
1581 that the ecclesiastical arrangements were finalized.  
However, the structure of the Christianizing mission 
of the church was already in place long before the expedition 
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set foot in the islands. Most parishes would later fall into the 
hands of the religious orders through the patronato real. The 
century that followed saw the increase in number of secular 
priests who provided better administration of the parishes.  
The insulars of both church and government were the 
first to instigate secularization of the parishes even before the 
end of the 18th century. The insulars asserted representation 
from their social class, not only in church but in civil 
government as well.  These started the conflicts of peninsulars 
and insulars who both had Spanish forebears.     
Schumacher’s  The Propaganda Movement (1880-
1895): The Creators of a Filipino Consciousness The Makers 
of a Revolution published in 1973 and The Revolutionary 
Clergy: The Filipino Clergy and the Nationalist Movement 
(1850-1903) published in 1981 gave accounts on how the 
secularization movements of the church were secretly put in 
place through the efforts of Fathers Gomez, parish priest of 
Bacoor and vicar forane of Cavite, and Father Pedro Pelaez, 
secretary of the Archbishop of Manila. Readers get a glimpse 
on the origins of the Insular and Filipino nationalism from these 
readings.  
According to Schumacher (1981), the movements 
were triggered by widespread abuses and discrimination against 
the Filipino clergy who were lowly treated as unworthy.  The 
tension escalated when the regulars attempted to divest the 
secular priests of their administered parishes.   
Father Pedro Pelaez was the first to denounce what the local 
clergy perceived as oppressive action by Spanish friars.  
When Pelaez died in an earthquake that hit Manila, 
Fathers Gomez, Burgos, and Zamorra carried on with the fight 
against the questioned friar orders. The three priests, however, 
were charged later with mutiny and sentenced to death by 
hanging. In February 17, 1872 they died as martyrs 
(Schumacher 1981:1-330).  
In the later part of the 18th century, the fight against 
inequalities in the government and the church, education, and 
livelihood opportunities became common themes in 
revolutionary visions.   
Veneracion’s (1997) Agos ng Dugong Kayumanggi: 
Isang Kasaysayan ng Pilipinas, Ileto’s Pasyon and Revolution: 
Popular Movements in the Philippines (1840-1910), 
Agoncillo’s (1990) History of the Filipino People; Majul’s 
(1977) Muslims in the Philippine, Gowing (1979) Muslim 
Filipinos– Heritage and Horizon, and Fast and Richardson’s 
(1979) Roots of Dependency Political and Economic 
Revolution 19th Century Philippines postulate the factors that 
led to the rise of nationalism among natives under Spanish 
oppressive rules.  
These were: (a) The exile of native laborers as a result 
of trade monopoly and the imposition of tax obligations on cash 
crops (Veneracion 1997:53); (b) even with the various tactics 
employed by the Spanish government to stop the political 
unification of the Filipinos, the essence of the native Filipino 
culture was sustained; (c) the belief in the anitos, diwatas, and 
anting-antings (amulets) continued (Veneracion 1997:53);  and 
(d) the story of the passion, death, and resurrection of Jesus 
Christ, which the friars used to strengthen the native’s religious 
piety and faith in Catholicism, was transformed by the natives 
into a metaphor of their struggles and a guide to the liberation 
of their consciousness (Ileto 1979:11-27).   
Moreover, the spread of modernity came with the 
opening of port areas (1834) in Manila, and later in Pangasinan, 
Iloilo, Zamboanga, Cebu, Tacloban, and Legazpi which 
resulted in the establishment of the banking system and the 
advancement of local trade (Agoncillo 1990: 118).   
Free trade with other states, also resulted in brisk 
production of the Manila Hemp in the Bicol region, coffee at 
Batangas, tabacco at the Cagayan Valley, and sugar cane in 
Pampanga, Iloilo, and Negros islands (Agoncillo  1990:119).   
These trade and production schemes paved the way for 
the development of local transportation, exchange, agriculture, 
and commerce. These afforded the natives opportunities to hone 
their social consciousness, heightened awareness, and shaped 
their sense of nationhood (Ileto 1979:6)  
The structural shift of indigenous society from its 
ethnic to trade-driven lifestyle, gave rise to the Filipino 
bourgeoisie that started with the Ilustrado class, from the ranks 
of natives, mestizos and creoles who were either landed gentry 
or compradors (Majul 1977:10-16). The Ilustrados who 
acquired their landholding or businesses, studied in the local 
universities and in Europe.They were the ones who pursued 
reforms during the Spanish rule (Majul 1977:7).  
Education paved the way for the weakening of 
regionalism in the 1860s and the 1870s initially with the 
passage of the Moret Decree of 1863, institutionalizing basic 
education all over the Philippine archipelago, and the 
imposition of Spanish language instructions as a national 
language (Fast and Richardson 1979:55).   
From 1886 to 1887, a number of children already 
studied the basic courses. There were more Indios and mestizos 
(1,769) than Spaniards (220) who had undergone basic 
education. It was in the school environment where social 
interactions and acquisition of new ideas were fostered. The 
school system became the breeding ground for the rudimentary 
notion of national identity. Filipinos began to identify 
themselves as either creole, Chinese mestizo, or indio (Fast and 
Richardson 1979:56).   
The Third Turning Point: The Nationalist Movement 
The works of Schumacher (1973 and 1981), and the 
books of Constantino (1975), Corpuz (1990), and Agoncillo 
(1990) provide extensive historical accounts on the nationalist 
movements in the Philippines. These books show the coercive 
implementation of commercial agriculture and the opening of 
the Philippines to world trade, which transformed the lives of 
the Filipinos.   
Insular nationalism originated from the feudal and 
agricultural economy rooted in the native Filipino way of life. 
The colonial regimes later changed these indigenous economic 
life into one more responsive to the national and international 
markets. Agricultural production, which were customarily 
intended for local needs were turned into export products. 
The change in their economic framework further 
brought the transformation of their social and cultural life. It 
paved way for the deeper stratification of Filipino citizens into 
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distinctive social classes such as the Principalia and the 
Ilustrado who served as heralds of social change in the period.   
The native Chinese and Chinese mestizos (De Jesus 
1989;Wickberg 1973) led the change, especially in terms of 
administration of the lands. The subsistence economy, then 
enough to serve individual needs in the community, was 
restructured to satisfy the demands of the foreign markets than 
to address the needs of the natives.  
In 1745 to 1892, the disparity created a new wave of 
unrest manifested in a new pattern of resistance that was no 
longer a reflection of religio-political discontent. It was a 
reflection of their discontent into anti-friar, anti- colonial 
government official or anti-colonial, and anti-feudal 
sentiments. 
Blaire and Robertson Volume V (1898) compliments 
to the works of Schumacher (1973), Constantino (1975), and 
Agoncillo (1990). The works pointed out contributory factors 
that led to the shift in Filipino consciousness in these periods. 
These factors were: (a) the continued internal strength of the 
native culture; (b) the opening of the Philippines to world trade 
and the new economic policies; (c) the introduction of formal 
education through the Moret Decree of 1863; and (d) the 
Secularization movement of the church and the martyrdom of 
fathers Gomez, Burgos, and Zamora.  
Works of Agoncillo (1990), Scumacher (1981;1973), 
and Constantino (1975) traced the development of the pioneers 
in the Filipino nationalist movement in the 1880s and identified 
progressive students as its leaders when they demanded change 
in the Spanish government.   
The major roles of propagandists like Jose Rizal, 
Marcelo H. Del Pilar, and Graciano Lopez Jaena were 
recognized as purveyors in the pursuit of reforms, in shaping 
ideas of nationhood, and the formation of a genuine Filipino 
national consciousness (Constantino 1975).  
Rizal wrote Noli Me Tangere and El Filibusterismo. 
The writings of Del Pilar effectively rebutted the anti-Filipino 
writings of Wenceslao Retana, Pablo Feced, and Vicente 
Barrantes in La Politica de España.  In the same manner the 
fortnightly paper, La Solidaridad, was published and managed 
by Rizal, Del Pilar, and Lopez Jaena  (Constantino 1975:152-
153). 
The Fourth Truning Point: Propaganda Movement, to KKK 
Nationalist Revolution 
Cushner’s (1973) Spain in the Philippines: From 
Conquest to Revolution summarizes the development of a 
nationalist Filipino consciousness by accounting for the 
worsening abuses by Spanish colonizers, the absence of basic 
freedoms, and the Ilustrados’ movement for reforms.  
His work pointed that portion of the elite population 
pushed for the Philippines to become a province of Spain and 
pushed for the acquisition of freedoms that only Spanish 
citizens then enjoyed. Furthermore, Cushner also recounted 
how the La Liga Filipina later transformed as a central voice 
for nationalist sentiments as it organizationally changed in 1892 
to serve as systematic propaganda machine against the 
Spaniards. 
Cushner (1973), described the time in which the 
movement occurred as the “period of the propaganda” and calls 
the players behind the movement “propagandists.”  The 
propaganda committee was established in Manila in 1888. The 
active participation of Marcelo H. Del Pilar in the movement, 
and as founder of the newspaper Diariong Tagalog brought him 
to Europe as representative of the group (Cushner 1973:222). 
This period was considered by experts as the time of 
commencement of the propaganda movement and crucial to the 
nationalist movement of Filipino youth in 1880s.  
The initial aim of the movement was to pursue reforms 
since the propagandists had aspired more for assimilation than 
independence (Cushner 1973:222). This was based on the 
aspiration toward assimilation rather than independence. They 
voiced their appeals for reforms through pamphlets, leaflets, 
magazines, books and by actual lobbying.  
According to Cushner, the Ilustrado organizations 
actively involved in the propaganda movement, include the 
Circulo-Hispano-Filipino, Cavite de Propaganda, Asociacion 
Hispano-Filipino, and the papers La Solidaridad and La Liga 
Filipina. Their demands included: (a) the recognition of the 
Philippines as a province of Spain; (b) equality between 
Spaniards and Filipinos before the law; (c) Filipino 
representation in the Spanish Cortes; and (d) the appointment 
of Filipino Clergy into parishes and the removal of friar priests. 
Economic demands include: (a) the stabilization of the policies 
of “free trade” in the Philippines and the removal of sanctions 
on trade; (b) finding ways to provide better markets for Filipino 
products; and (c) to expedite measures in the liberalization of 
the country’s economic affairs. 
The movement was launched in Spain as there was no 
freedom of expression in the country. Despite of this, certain 
local organizations took the courage to express the need for 
reforms in the country. One of them was the Diariong Tagalog, 
which was published under the auspices of Del Pilar. The other 
was Asosacion Hispano Filipino, which was established in 
Spain in July of 1888 under the leadership of Miguel Morayta.   
The La Liga Filipina was established in July 3, 1892 
to realize the formation of a prime Filipino nation. The election 
of the La Liga officers took place in the household of Ong-
Junco in Manila. Ambrosio Salvador was elected as President, 
Agustin de la Rosa as Fiscal, Bonifacio Arevalo as Treasurer, 
and Deodato Arellano as Secretary. 
Dr. Jose Rizal was appointed adviser and also drafted 
the constitution with the following objectives: (a) the 
unification of all Islands of the archipelago under one 
representative to the Spanish Courts; (b) equal protection for 
all; (c) Pursue the right to resistance against all forms of 
oppression and injustice; (d) the advancement of education, 
agriculture, and trade; and (e) to engage in all forms of study 
and efforts toward reforms.  
 
V. The Nature of Contemporary Philippine Politics 
 From national histories crafted by scholars Agoncillo, 
Guerrero, Constantino, Majul, Hutchcroft, Sidel, McCoy, and 
Tan are accounts on contemporary Philippine politics largely 
shaped by the American colonial institutions and clothed in 
GSTF Journal of Law and Social Sciences (JLSS) Vol.6 No.1, 2017
©The Author(s) 2017. This article is published with open access by the GSTF 
7
republicanism form, such as:  The municipal code of 1901; The 
Schurman Commission; The Philippine Bill of 1902 originally 
known as the Cooper Act; The Jones Law (1916); and the 
Tydings McDuffie Law.   
These are also shown in the work of May (1984) 
entitled Social Engineering in the Philippines: The Aims, 
Execution and Impact of American Colonial Policy (1900-
1913), which accounts for strategies of reconstituting the 
Filipino villages to transform the native’s everyday life. Its 
contributions in comparative colonial studies is a valuable 
interpretative work on institutionalism. 
There is extensive scholarly work that explores the 
analytical tracts of the dyadic factional model in Philippine 
politics. Pattern shows why election campaigns and 
governments are monopolized by the wealthy who support local 
politicians.  
The subject is also elaborated in the works of  
Hollnsteiner’s (1963) Dynamics of Power in a Philippine 
Municipality, Lande’s (1965) Leaders, Factions, and Parties: 
The Structure of Philippine Politics, and Agpalo’s (1972) The 
Political Elite and the People: A Study of Politics in Oriental 
Mendoro.These studies demonstrate the building blocks of 
Philippine politics founded in alliances, factions and kinship, 
exchanges of goods and services, as well as political machines 
(Kerkvliet 1991:8).  
Corpuz’s (1990) Roots of the Filipino Nation Vol. I 
and Vol. II, Kerkvliet’s (1990) Everyday Politics in the 
Philippines Class and Status Relations in a Central Luzon 
Village, and Simbulan’s (2005) The Modern Principalia: The 
Historical Evolution of the Philippine Ruling Oligarchy provide 
synoptic accounts on the development of patronage politics.  
These works analyze how contemporary leadership in 
Philippine politics became a monopoly of the middle and upper 
class clans who first established prominence as the Principalia, 
who were originally the prominent land-owning and propertied 
chieftains, during the Spanish colonial period.   
In Mindanao these were the sultans and datus who 
resisted Spanish rule. They later become the Illustrado, the few 
big native landowners who were literate in the Spanish 
language, politically influential, and belong to the socio-
economic elite and ruling class (Simbulan 2005; Corpus 1957).   
The literature also describes the changes in the 
hierarchical structure of Philippine politics. Corpuz 1957 and 
Simbulan 2005 emphasized the similarities in political change 
across the Philippine archipelago. As David Rosenberg (1974) 
summarizes: 
“These observations about the apparent 
immutability of rural society no doubt reflect 
some element of fact.  Traditional ways have 
indeed persisted throughout the “decades of 
development”. When such changes have 
occurred in the rural sector, they often have 
been attributed to developments in the urban, 
national, or external environment.” 
From Reducciones to Townships and Electoral Politics 
May (1984) reveals the institutionalization of rational-
legal bureaucracy American-style in both national and local 
governments in the country, as well as the system of public 
school instructions under Act No. 174 for compulsory basic 
education and English instructions. The first bureaucrats in 
pursuance of Act No. 854 known as the Pensionado Program 
that sent children of Filipino oligarchs for foster-parenting and 
political education to the US. When the pensionados came back 
to the Philippines, they formed part of the original bureaucrats 
that ran the Philippine state during American occupation 
through the Commonwealth, and even until after the Japanese 
occupation.  
Literature focuses on the mutual aid networks founded 
on the web of familial ties because this appears to be the most 
durable theory of Philippine politics. This widely affirmed by 
academics, journalists, diplomats who observed that Filipino 
politics indeed revolve around interpersonal relationships, 
relies on the familial social relations, concedes to the patron 
client norm, and reifies personalistic factions ( Kervliet 1991; 
Agpalo 1972; Lande 1965; Hollnsteiner 1963). 
Salazar’s (1997) historical perspective demonstrates 
that significant political transformation occurred through 
merger and interchange between native leadership categories 
and colonial categories from the time of Spanish intervention 
until after the time of the Katipunan revolution of 1896. He 
argues that strands of colonial politics overlapped with the 
emerging native politics in reoriented functions and new 
leadership ideologies. Furthermore, he showed how the new 
native politics accommodated resistance-oriented leaders, from 
the pre-war and post-war periods, to the Marcos period.  
Salazar’s (1997) periodization and categorization of 
sources of leadership and orientation suggests a heuristic device 
for understanding the political development of the Philippines 
according to: (a) types and categories of leadership; (b) tasks 
and obligations of leaders; (c) origins and sources of leadership;  
(d) characteristics of leadership; (e) ideologies or overarching 
principles and approaches of leadership; (f) language and 
discourse or the delineated leadership culture;  and (g) notions 
of sovereignty and factors result to the loss of one’s sovereignty 
and/or credibility as a leader.   
Moreover, Salazar provides proof of evolution of 
native Filipino political structure and culture according to a 
defined framework with the following constituitive elements: 
(a) the basic political institutions such as the four pillars of 
leadership in the country— the datu, babaylan, panday, and 
bagani; (b) the formation of the nation; and (c) the formation of 
Philippine society and politics.  
Anderson’s (1995) Cacique Democracy in the 
Philippines: Origins and Dreams, however, shows how 
democratic institutions emerge in the context of the rule of law 
as popularized by the native upper classes (cacique) who later 
became the country’s political administrators alongside Spanish 
religious institutions– the Catholic Church and schools, as well 
as private business and various enterprises. The so-called 
“cacique democracy” became entrenched in the archipelago 
overtime.  
However, parallel to this period of transition from 
Spanish to American administration also came political 
institutions such what was reported in May’s (1984) work. May 
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explained that the establishment of the bureaucracy came from 
the breakdown of national to subnational or local government 
units.  May’s work is very important as it aids us in 
understanding the extent of popular participation in governance 
from national down to the barangay level as early as the turn of 
the 20th century.  
American intervention through the institutionalization 
of the electoral process became a critical feature of democratic 
political dynamics. This paved the way  for the change in 
political orientation of mestizos and participation of the 
common native.   
Cacique democracy, thrived on a political 
environment where elections, political parties, and factions 
became the most popular institutional exercise, giving rise to 
the creation of government units from the biggest to the 
smallest unit— the barangay.  
Politicians regularly shifted from one camp to the 
other. Their relationship with their contenders and constituents 
became highly personality-based and founded on ideals of 
reciprocity or utang na loob. With this, turncoatism also 
emerged and made party loyalty an expendable commodity. 
Political arrangements became patrimonial. (Agpalo 1972:374; 
Lande 1965:10-123; Hollnsteiner 1963:86-110). 
Philippine Developmentalism and the Emergence of Reform 
Politics 
A historical surveys of reforms in the period of 
Independence (1898) to EDSA I (1986) show a series of 
resistance as well as massive sources of literature in political 
reforms. These movements reflect the genuine context and 
sentiment leading to the formation of a truly independent 
nation. They are integral parts of the key enabling mechanisms 
for a developmental Philippine state amid a neo-colonial order 
from the Roxas leadership to the contemporary regimes.  
The development of the peasant movements and the 
agrarian revolution waged by such groups as the Hukbong 
Mapagpalaya ng Bayan (HMB) or the People’s Liberation 
Army, and the Bagong Hukbong Bayan (BHB) New People’s 
Army are also important institutions to consider when it comes 
to understanding sources of resistance relative to the context of 
the sources of political reforms.   
 
VI. The History of Neo-Colonial relationship between the 
US and the Philippines 
On July 4, 1946, the United States (US) government 
granted the Philippine independence with a promise that the 
Philippines will be given full freedom and would gain full state 
membership in the international community after 10 years of 
tutelage starting 1935 (in pursuant to the Tydings McDuffie 
Law). The restriction placed the country in an awkward position 
as regards to its status in the international affairs.  
Standing as an independent state was a struggle since 
majority of nations were facing reconstruction problems after 
World War II. With resources devastated and livelihood in 
shambles, everyone had to start from scratch. The Filipino 
leadership had no choice but to rely on the US blueprint for the 
Philippine development.     
There were manifestations that made the Philippines 
appear like a truly independent state: there was a flag and a 
constitution and elections were held. In reality, however, the US 
was running the administration of the Philippine state (Guerrero 
1979). But the country’s path to development was hampered by 
the United State’s constant intervention in the Philippine 
affairs. In fact, the relationship between the US and the 
Philippines in early 1946 was a neo-colonial one. 
From this, it can be surmised that although the colonial 
structure was no longer deep seated, the country’s 
independence is superficial. According to nationalist historian 
Renato Constantino, the neo-colonial system is realized in the 
following manner:  
“It means the continued US dominance over 
the state of the economy of the nation. We 
become a market of American products, or 
their source of raw materials, if not an open 
field of American capital. To guarantee their 
control over us and likewise to guarantee that 
the country becomes a launching pad of all 
American military operations within Asia, 
the US made sure of the installation of its 
naval and air base in Philippine territory that 
is not necessarily part of their sovereignty.”  
(Constantino and Constantino 1979:213-214)   
    It is now imperative to scrutinize the political-
economic mechanisms established by the US in the Philippines.  
What constitutes all these mechanisms?  In what way did the 
US retain control over a state that was granted pseudo-
independence?   
Hisorical work written by Constantino (1975), 
Agoncillo (1990), and Corpus (1990) tell us how the US was 
able to maintain its hold on supposedly-independent Philippine 
state. The resource base and the security of the country during 
the neo-colonial period were tied up to: (a) sustained free trade 
and parity rights with the American citizens; and (b) the 
establishment of military bases and the cooperation between 
American servicemen and the Philippine Army (Constantino 
and Constantino 1997). 
Constantino and Constantino’s (1997) Filipinas: Ang 
Bagong Lumipas II: 1940-1965 salin in Ariel Borlongan and 
Stephen (1986) The United States and the Philippines, suggest 
that neo-colonialism could mean greater freedoms for the 
Philippines.  
The literature advances the view that the neo-colonial 
relationship between the US and the Philippines could set the 
stage for a broader independence absent in colonialism. The 
Philippines had had more elbow room in postwar 1946. Stephen 
(1986:183) argues: 
“To say that colonialism was replaced by 
neo-colonialism is not to suggest that the two 
relationships are equivalent.The latter gives 
the Philippines more freedom to maneuver, it 
can play great powers off against one another, 
it can join regional pacts, it can garner 
support in international organizations.  Neo-
colonialism also places greater constraints 
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upon the action of the United States. 
American personnel may be stationed in the 
Philippines only with Manila’s consent, US 
intervention in the Philippine affairs cannot 
be too overt, and US officials must take pain 
not to offend Philippine sovereignty and 
nationalism.  In short, even if the only 
difference between the colonial and the neo-
colonial relationships was a legal one —the 
specific locus of sovereignty— this 
difference can have a significant effect on the 
behavior of nation-states.”  
Although, the independence of the country gained 
during the period was not the idea the Filipinos had aspired for, 
it was a kind that could open the door to broader freedoms. At 
least, in a neo-colonial system, there is arguably more room for 
a former colony to be more innovative.   
Thus, it is then incumbent upon the Filipino nation to 
have worked for a total independence. The way to transform the 
country’s neo-colonial history is to view the past with a better 
perspective of the Philippine-US foreign relations.  
A comparative historical analysis (CHA) starting with 
the Third Republic or that which commenced in 1946, suggests 
that: (a) leadership patterns in Philippine political 
administration and state structure were products of unusual 
concentrations of power and coercive capability of the landed 
and comprador classes (Guerrero 2005:101-123); and that (b) 
the Philippine state eventually collaborated with American 
imperial interest in the Asia Pacific region (Guerrero 2005:68-
72;74-78). 
This Philippine style of developmental state is one 
which Kohli (2004:17) refers to as that of a neo-patrimonial 
state.   
It is then crucial to examine each leadership style of 
the elected executive from 1946 up to 1970s as foundation of a 
contemporary developmental state.  
The Rise of the Hukbalahap 
 This paper argues that if the start of the propaganda 
movement served as the leading turning point in the 
conceptualization of national reforms that paved way for 
nationalist consciousness and the idea of state formation and 
revolution against colonialism, the rise of the Hukbalahap can 
be considered as the second major turning point, in the 
development the concept of Filipino liberation.   
In the works of Guerrero (2005:32-34) and 
Constantino (1975:398-404) are sections on the heroism of the 
Hukbalahap as anti-Japanese revolutionary forces and their 
strong clamor for reforms as historically interwoven with the 
strongest aspirations of the Filipino people.  
 The Hukbalahap was a watershed of Filipino reform 
social movement of, by, and for the Filipinos. It had a purely 
Filipino people’s army, which organized provincial and 
municipal governments fighting against actual fascist colonial 
aggression (Guerrero 2005:32-34 and Constantino 1975:398-
404). The Hukbalahap fought the Japanese army after the 
American forces left the country.  
 All over the country Filipinos experienced suppression 
at the hands of the Military Police Command’s USAFFE 
puppets and the erstwhile Japanese Constabulary. After the war, 
landlords took back full control of their lands and demanded 
rental arrears from the peasants and organized their private 
armies.  
The office of the Hukbalahap was raided by the US 
Counter-Intelligence Corps and transferred it to the city of 
Manila from San Fernando, Pampanga. A Democratic Alliance 
was formed for a pretend republic to operate while the 
Hukbalahap was converted into the Hukbalahap Veteran’s 
League.  
There were mass arrests and tortures of red fighters 
and common people. There were also massacres of families and 
assassinations perpetrated by the military police and the civilian 
guards (Guerrero 2005:33). 
 What made things worse is that the Filipino freedom 
fighters decide to give up their fight for independence after they 
were convinced by Lava and Taruc who thought that the people 
were already tired of war and that independence would simply 
fall from the hands of the enemy. 
The Third Republic of the Philippines and the US-backed 
Regimes: Roxas  (1946-1948) 
Zaide’s (1996) Documentary Sources of Philippine 
History Tomo XII reveals the leadership style of Manuel Roxas 
and his connivance with the US.  His administration passed the 
“Parity Rights Agreement.” He ordered the expulsion from the 
parliament of congressmen who stood against the agreement.  
He passed the US-RP military bases agreement and 
inaugurated the Clark Airfield and the Subic Naval Base. His 
National Land Settlement Administration (NLSA), was the 
agency responsible for the resettlement policy, which served as 
the assets reforms program for the state instead of direct 
redistribution of previously contested lands prior to the Third 
Republic. 
In the US-RP relations, colonialism was kept on solid 
ground. The US monetary assistance had parallel provisions to 
sustain its interests in the Philippines.  The US infused USD 
620 million into the Philippine economy, but never provided 
any provision for reparation of damages, should there be 
transgressions in the implementation of “parity rights” between 
Filipinos and Americans in the exploitation of local resources 
(Tan 1997:91-92).   
Quirino Period (1948-1953) 
Santos’ (1999) The Presidents of the Postwar 
Republic, 1946-1965” in Rosario Cortes’ (1999) Philippine 
Presidents: 100 years, Constantino and Constantino’s (1997) 
Filipinas: Ang Bagong Lumipas II (1940-1965) and Guerrero’s 
(1979) Philippine Society and Revolution, provide literature on 
Quirino’s administration.  
Vice President Elpidio Quirino took-over the 
presidency when Roxas died. His term established various 
agricultural infrastructures. He was steadfast in his belief that 
agricultural development should go hand in hand with industrial 
development (Santos 1999:193). Guerrero (1979) in Philippine 
Society and Revolution writes: 
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“Fearing the onrush of the revolutionary 
mass movement, Quirino acted to inveigle 
the people with an offer of amnesty to the 
Hukbalahap and a pledge to reinstate and pay 
the back salaries of the Democratic Alliance 
congressmen who had been ousted in 1946.  
The principal condition set for the granting of 
such concessions was the surrender of arms 
and the registration of the Red fighters of the 
Hukbalahap.”(Guerrero 2005: 36-37) 
Quirino signed the Mutual Defense Treaty with 
America on on the 1st of August 1951. Militarization put an end 
to the Hukbalahap. Then Secretary of State, Ramon 
Magsaysay, was tasked to round up the Hukbalahap. The 
Americans aggressively intervened using the strategy of 
attraction boosting Magsaysay’s image as a man for the masses, 
rather than as a  “huk killing machine” in a psychological 
warfare that ensued (Constantino and Constantino 1997:263).   
Magsaysay Period (1954-1957) 
In Cortes’ (1999) Philippine Presidents: 100 Years, 
Zaide’s (1996) Documentary Sources of Philippine History 
Tomo XI, and Guerrero’s (1979) Philippine Society and 
Revolution, it was revealed how Magsaysay worked under US 
instructions. He was elected congressman in his district and 
later became secretary of the Department of National Defense 
before he became president in 1953 (Santos in Cortes 1999:194-
195). 
The duplicitous Magsaysay administration stood for 
the masses and served the American interest at the same time 
that it was at the peak of American intervention in Philippine 
governance. This was the time of cold war, between the US and 
the USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics).   
The US financial assistance was always the crucial 
factor in Magsaysay’s agenda and counter revolutionary 
strategies to stop the rebellion among ailing farmers and 
workers as the foundation of his administration.   
Nationalist Senator Claro M. Recto to lambasted the 
position of the Magsaysay administration. Magsaysay defended 
his position, saying he was making a “positive form of 
nationalism” (Guerrero 1979:43) Guerrero in Philippine 
Society and Revolution (2005:40-41) elaborated: 
“…the Magsaysay puppet regime sabotaged 
the ceaseless popular demand for the 
abrogation of the Bell Trade Act by 
negotiating for its mere revision. Thus did the 
Laurel-Langley Agreement come into being. 
This new treaty aggravated the economic 
subservience of the Philippines to US 
imperialism by allowing the US monopolies 
to enjoy parity rights in all kinds of business.”  
Garcia Period (1957-1961) 
Lichauco (1982),  Agoncillo and Guerrero (1986), 
Zaide (1996), and Constantino and Constantino (1997) reveal 
how Carlos P. Garcia continued the policies of the Magsaysay 
administration. Garcia’s regime can be considered the prime of 
Philippine developmental state. His administration was 
technocratic. It became a historical foundation of the Philippine 
developmental state. After winning the presidency in 1957, 
Garcia focused on programs emphasizing economic freedoms. 
During Garcia’s regime, the National Economic 
Council (August 21, 1958), pushed for the resolution entitled 
the Filipino First Policy as basis of the economy despite the 
flooding of foreign capital into the nation. This stabilized 
Filipino enterprises in an economy where foreign capital is very 
strong.  Although the policy started as a limited form of 
nationalist expression, the concept actually motivated the 
opening of hidden nationalist feelings to flare up. It is a very 
simple slogan but it threatened powerful blocks such as the 
American business clubs in the Philippines (Constantino and 
Constantino 1997:335). 
In the 1950s the nation was again torn by two opposing 
sentiments, namely: (a) the need to promote a self-reliant 
economy, a condition considered still advanced in Garcia’s 
time; and (b) the anxiety over the weakening of the American 
financial grip.  
Under Garcia’s administration, the establishment of an 
“integrated steel industry” to be funded by government capital 
was given due consideration. The Iligan Integrated Steel Mills, 
Inc. was then built.  
Through adoption of mercantilist policies, the 
Philippines accomplished in ten years what it failed to 
accomplish in fifty years of free trade. This is a dramatic 
transformation of what used to be a preponderantly agricultural, 
import-export economy, into a semi industrial economy.   
This was clearly reflected in the sharp increase in the 
industrial contribution to the nation’s overall productivity. In 
1949, the contribution of our so-called “industrial” sector to the 
gross national product was a meager 8%. By 1960, it rose to 
17.9%.   
This is a conclusive proof that our obsolete, antiquated 
economy was undergoing a structural transformation and that 
an industrial revolution Philippine-style was very much in 
progress (Lichauco 1988:30).  
 
Macapagal Period (1962-1965) 
Lichauco in Jose (1988), Zaide (1996), Constantino 
and Constantino (1997), and Santos in Cortes (1999) provide us 
a glimpse of Diosdado Macapacal’s regime. Before he became 
president, he was elected congressman in 1953, then as vice 
president in 1957. Of all the Philippine presidents, some claim 
that he was the one who truly hails from the masses— “the poor 
boy of Lubao.” Under his administration, the economy relapsed 
to the foreign model. 
Macapagal wanted to alleviate the conditions of 
ordinary Filipinos. However, he failed to provide a 
comprehensive solution to the country’s problems. An example 
is the Agricultural Land Reform Code (ALRC) of 1963 that was 
suppose to pull up the status of farmers. However, the change 
of the farmer’s status in relation to landowners was subject to 
the latter’s consent and there were only a few communities 
where this system worked. The law, conclusively, became 
ineffective in providing economic stability to the supposed 
beneficiaries.  
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On the surface, the Macapagal administration, was 
nationalistic. The expansion of our national territory appeared 
to be what the administration intended to offer to the nation. For 
instance, it vowed to reclaim Sabah. 
 Furthermore, it tried to renew the significance of 
Philippine sovereignty and moved the country’s Independence 
Day from July 4, 1946  to June 12, 1898. The first celebration 
was on June 12, 1962 and was witnessed by almost a million 
Filipinos at the Luneta Park (Santos in Cortes 1999:208).  
The celebration reflected a spectacle that highlighted 
how “independence” meant deeply to the Filipino people. 
Macapacal, in a way, succeeded to strengthen the illusion of 
sovereignty as his foreign policy remained pro-American.  
It is arguably an illusion since most Filipinos still use 
the idea of indepence to puruse personal interests. On a national 
scale, the Macapagal administration still pursued economic 
policies that favor the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
the World Bank (WB) (Constantino and Constantino 
1997:342). 
The Philippines was reopened to free trade after 
Macapagal’s “de-control policy” was implemented. American 
corporations pulled out USD300 million in profits and was not 
able to repatriate during the Filipino First Policy of tight 
economic control (Constantino and Constantino 1997:246-
247).  
Macapagal hoped that through US financial aid, the 
government’s intensive need for US Dollars can be addressed. 
Hence, from that time on the dictates of the IMF and WB 
became the ruler of Philippine economy.  
The following are the effects of Macapagal’s policy 
for national development (Lichauco in Jose 1988:32-38): (a) 
from an exchange rate of PHP2 to USD1, it became PHP3.90 
to USD1, which caused the inflation of goods in the local 
market; (b) the flooding of foreign goods that weakened and 
caused the death of local industries; (c) the increased need for 
dollars to support the country’s involvement in foreign trade, 
which triggered foreign debts to increase from USD360 million 
in 1962 into USD599.5 million in 1965;  (e) decrease in the 
contribution of the manufacturing sector to the national 
economy  from 17.9% to 17.1%; and (f) the dependency among 
the leaders “on assistance and advices” from foreign “experts” 
for solution to problems. 
The Marcos Period (1966-1986) 
The story of Ferdinand E. Marcos’ reign can be 
gleaned from works of Lichauco in Jose (1982); Agoncillo and 
Guerrero (1986); Schirmer and Shalom (1987); Zaide (1996);  
and Tiglao (1998).  
Ferdinand Marcos became president in 1965. He 
remained in power for 20 years and crafted a kind of Sultanism 
that sowed the seeds of struggle for national freedom and 
democracy.  
In 1972, his administration institutionalized a foreign 
investment-led economy following the free trade of the IMF. 
Instead of helping the economy, the policy allowed foreign 
investors to suck our country dry. Marcos himself understood 
the predicament and announced in 1969:    
“The profit remittances of local 
subsidiaries of foreign corporations 
are among the invisibles that tend to 
increase the size of our current 
deficits. They amount to about $120 
million to $150 million annually.  
Since they enjoy the hospitality of 
our country and profit from our 
markets, it would be proper for them 
to help relieve some of our balance 
of payments pressure by reinvesting 
their profits abroad [meaning in the 
Philippines]..”  
(Lichauco in Jose 1982:39) 
The national economy slumped because the it can no 
longer be fixed from its existing condition, abetted no less by 
the quality of leadership which did not respond to needs of the 
time.  
Marcos understood the root of the economic problem 
but he chose to focus on his plan to hold on to power. Before he 
became president, for example, Marcos criticized the dispatch 
of a Military Engineering Batallion to Vietnam as proposed by 
Macapagal.  
When he became president, his views reversed and 
sent Filipino troupes to Vietnam. Communism had intensified 
and became the cause of tensions outside and inside the nation.   
The Philippines became host to the internal meetings 
of the US and its allies on October 25, 1966 to strengthen a 
coalition against socialist countries. The nation protested 
against the aggravating situation. Progressive organizations 
were established that brought insurrectionary movements to life 
again.  
Nemesis of the traditional political system were born: 
the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and the New 
People’s Army (NPA). In major towns and cities the workers 
and the students were active in protest movements. But amid 
the worsening condition, all the state could think of was to 
effect constitutional change. Jobs and justice were the needs of 
the Filipino masses. But the state responded with politics and 
oppressive laws. 
After the declaration of Martial Law in Sept. 21, 1972 
the American Chamber of Commerce of the Philippines sent a 
telegram: 
“The American Chamber of Commerce 
wishes you every success in your endeavor to 
restore peace and order, business confidence 
and economic growth and the well-being of 
the Filipino people and the nation. We assure 
you of our confidence and cooperation in 
achieving these objectives.  We are 
communicating these feelings to our 
associate and affiliates in the United States.” 
(Schirmer and Shalom 1987:229-230)    
When he first sat in office, the Filipinos believed the 
promises of Ferdinand Marcos. He promised the realization of 
a genuine land reform, improvement of the ordinary people’s 
lives, not sending Filipino soldiers to Vietnam, and others. Not 
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long after, the nation realized that the Marcos administration 
was no different from previous administrations, especially in its 
ties with the US. Despite massive protests Marcos, won a 
second term as President of the nation making him the only 
president to be elected twice in the country. 
Money and intimidation were the prime movers in 
1969, said to be among the dirtiest electoral exercises that took 
place in the country. Marcos’ electoral victory in 1979, 
triggered massive protest because of the continued disregard to 
the poor situation of Philippine society.  There were widespread 
protest against government’s insincerity in implementing 
reforms, rampant criminality and extreme poverty. The chasm 
between rich and poor widened. 
The immediate result of the Martial Law was the 
incarceration of many of Marcos’ adversaries and activists. The 
persecution of dissenters were intensified in the guise of anti-
criminality campaigns. Private armies were dismantled and 
unlicensed firearms were confiscated. Curfew hours were set 
between midnight and four in the morning. The government, 
was effective in these aspects for a few months, as chaos and 
criminality gradually went down. 
A broad spectrum of protests gradually unmasked 
Marcos’ intent to sustain himself in power.  Marcos suspended 
congress and wrested the powers to make laws, which he 
proclaimed by way of presidential decrees and letters of 
instructions, and other issuances. Marcos did this as part of his 
legitimation schemes. 
During Martial Law, General Order No. 2 was issued 
by the Secretary of National Defense. This instructed the 
military to jail all dissenters and oppositionists involved with 
insurrectionary or rebellion groups (Agoncillo and Guerrero 
1986:585).   
In the name of “national interest” lawmakers who 
opposed the Marcos dictatorship were arrested. They were 
Benigno Aquino, Jr., Jose W. Diokno, Jovito Salongga, to name 
a few.  Even students and teachers, school employees and 
entrepreneurs critical of the government were jailed without 
legal charges.  
Through Letter of Instruction No. 1, the printing press, 
radio, newspapers, and television channels were all shut down.  
The people were moving blindly on the situation of the country.  
Along this was the loss of freedom of expression and the 
freedom to organize and freely assemble. 
 
VII. Developmentalism Under a Dictatorship  
Reform politics here is drawn from the orientation of 
developmental states that are tied up to the greater debate on 
state formation. Here, state structures were considered products 
of the unusual concentrations of power and coercive ability 
rather than being a direct response to the functional demands of 
a development strategy. 
 In the regime, pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 6, 
the bureaucracy was reorganized. The edict laid down the 
grounds for penalties for those who did not deserve public 
office. The slogan “Sa ikauunlad ng bayan, disiplina ang 
kailangan” (for the country to progress, discipline is needed) 
was widely popularized to prop up its vision of “Bagong 
Lipunan” (New Society).  As a way to save the government 
from the enemies of the state, he ordered for the dismissal of 
the 10% of 60,000 of government employees. 
   Posturing to promote assets reform and assets 
redistribution, Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 27. It 
placed the whole country under a land reform program where 
every farmer was given a chance to acquire three hectares of 
land with natural water sources or five if land had no natural 
water sources available.   
The coverage of the program was limited only to rice 
and corn fields. But long before it took off, the program was 
already seen as ill-fated.  
Landowners refused to redistribute of their properties 
to the farmers. Landowners stopped lending to peasants money 
to fund their fertilizer inputs, pesticides and even the seedlings, 
and curtailed water supply.  
Masagana 99 was then implemented to support farm 
credits for pesticide, fertilizers and seedling inputs. However, 
technological advancement in agriculture and food production 
remained very low and backward. Next to this is a new face of 
exploitation at the rural communities: 
“There was a shift from the extraction of 
landlord rent on the basis of landownership; 
profits by traders who sold the fertilizers and 
pesticides assumed a major role in the 
extraction of surplus value. Even small 
landowning peasants were drawn into the 
orbit of commercial exploitation owing to the 
increasing requirements for inputs…Having 
little capital, they fell prey to new and more 
inequitable sharing arrangements with 
landlords or with traders. Worse, with the 
increase of capital costs many of the small 
farmers had to sell off their lands and joined 
the growing mass of property-less wage- 
workers in the countryside.” (Tiglao 
1998:36-37) 
Classic literature on Filipino experience of 
dictatorship is found in the 1973 Constitution.  Marcos 
legitimized his Sultanistic regime with the establishment of the 
Bagong Lipunan Constitution or New Society Constitution.  
This was another step to sustain his power in office. 
His term was to end in 1973 so he called for a Constitutional 
Convention (CONCON) in September 25, 1972 to draft a 
constitution. The document was presented to a so-called 
Citizen’s Assembly, which ratified the new constitution.  
In a series of a manipulated referendum, Marcos was 
able to consolidate his political power. Through Proclamation 
No. 1102 the New Constitution was promulgated in 1973. The 
following were the results after the ratification of the 
constitution (Agoncillo and Guerrero 1986: 587-588): (a) 
official abolition of the legislature; (b) unification of the 
position of president and prime minister in the person of 
Ferdinand Marcos alone; (c) the change of government from 
presidential to parliamentary; and (d) the president was 
mandated to call for an interim assembly. 
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Under his “constitutional authoritarianism,” the power 
was concentrated in the hands of the Marcoses whose family 
and cronies became prime beneficiaries of his regime. Marcos 
was the president, his wife Imelda was governor of the whole 
of Manila and secretary of the Ministry of Human Settlements. 
Daughter Imee Marcos was national president of the Kabataang 
Barangay and lawmaker at the Batasang Pambansa. Marcos’ 
sister Elizabeth became governor of Ilokos, while Benjamin 
Kokoy Rumualdez, favorite brother of Imelda became governor 
of Leyte, Ambassador to the US, and a lawmaker in the 
Batasang Pambansa among the posts. Thus, “conjugal 
dictatorship” and the Marcos and Rumualdez dynasties were 
started. (Mijares 1976) 
Along with the New Constitution were the presence of 
the US military bases and the army on the watch to protect their 
interests. Presidential Guard Batallion (PGB), the Intelligence 
Service of the AFP (ISAFP), and the National Intelligence 
Service Authority (NISA), were there to strictly monitor 
government employees, political detainees, workers’ and the 
students’ movements.   
These intelligence units were involved in tortures and 
summary executions that disregard human dignity of activists 
and individuals affiliated with the left. The military forces used 
the anti-communist campaign to justify their massive human 
rights violations, committed in the form of tortures, warrantless 
arrests, salvaging, detentions without cases filed in court, and 
forced disappearances.  Amnesty International reported:  
The mission found convincing evidence that 
the employment of torture was widespread. 
Of 107 prisoners interviewed, 71 informed 
the delegates that they had been tortured.  
The conclusion is unavoidable that torture of 
prisoners was part of the general approach to 
the treatment of suspects. This had the effects 
of intimidating all those arrested on suspicion 
of having committed political offenses.  None 
of the prisoners interviewed had been 
convicted, although trial proceedings have 
begun for some of them.” (Schirmer and 
Shalom 1987: 188) 
The Marcos dictatorship continued to exploit the 
situation together with the US.  From the mountainous areas of 
Northern Luzon, to the Central plains of Luzon, the Visayan 
Islands, and in the forests of Mindanao, all the nation had but 
one cry– “Down with the Marcos Regime!”  Many 
organizations lost their strengths and finally died. Only the 
Muslim separatists and the underground leftist movement had 
held their ground to pursue their armed resistance.  
Massive literature also provides ample account on the 
gradual rise of militancy among dissenters seeking to topple 
down the Marcos regime and seeking for reforms. Many joined 
the movements that combat structural repression.  
One of these movements was the Katipunan ng mga 
Demokratikong Sosyalistang Pilipino (KDSP) of 1971— a 
moderate left organization. At first KDSP believed that the 
armed component is not an absolute necessity to achieve its 
objective. Ed Jopson was an example. The armed movement of 
the CPP-NPA and the expulsion of those disillusioned members 
of the KDSP resolved and pursued an ideology and strategy that 
worked.   
In 1976, the SANDIGAN built an armed component 
with strong faith and standpoint that convinced opposition 
leaders like Senator Francisco Rodrigo and Jovito Salonga. It 
was declared illegal in 1978.  But in the 1980s, the group was 
able to sustain its influence and used guerrilla warfare to 
weaken the government of the dictatorship in the countryside.  
As a result, the government was in a quandary as to 
where and what it should tackle first, the countryside where the 
CPP-NPA-NDF had set their camps, the cities which served as 
base of the KDSP, or Mindanao where the Moro National 
Liberation Movement– Bangsa Moro Army (MNLF-BMA) 
sowed terror. 
Reform politics in the country hints an influence from 
the left. For instance, the local literature on anti-bureaucratism 
starts with understanding about the existence of the three basic 
problems of Philippine society coined out by the Marxist left: 
(a) bureaucrat capitalism;  (b) feudalism;  and  (c) imperialism.  
The left describes Philippine society as semi-colonial 
and semi-feudal state (Guerrero [1979]2005). This is because 
US monopoly capitalism, subordinated and impinges on the 
feudal mode of production of the Philippines. America uses 
violence and deception and manages to impose itself on the 
Filipino people. The US had duped the Philippine oligarchy into 
believing that it will save them from Spanish colonialism, as it 
employed counterrevolutionary tactics for a war of aggression, 
and has held the Philippines under its direct control as a neo-
colony up to the present time. 
At the end of the day, people come to realize that 
historically symptomatic of the backward economic condition 
of dependent states, the Philippine government became tied up 
to foreign debts at the following rate of accumulation and norms 
of debt servicing, from the Marcos administration to Arroyo’s 
regime: 
 
Figure No. 2: Philippine Foreign Debt Experience 
(“Philippine Debt, Starlight Express” by D. Acap, S. Chiong, K. 
Puentevella and E. Velasco) 
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Figure No. 3: Philippine Debt Servicing Norm 
(“Philippine Debt, Starlight Express” by D. Acap, S. Chiong, K. 
Puentevella and E. Velasco) 
 
‘Almost 1/3 or more of the national 
budget goes to interest payments on 
national debts owing a lot of money 
from creditors.  The debt continues to 
snowball. It never significantly 
decrease at all with the last Aquino 
administration leaving with an 
outstanding $ 65 Billion of loans.  
The proof of the pudding is that the 
money saved for debt service 
balloons every year.  The Philippine 
government borrows to pay the 
money that it borrowed and this has 
been a practice for many years. To 
keep government afloat and service 
its debt, it resorts to borrowing from 
foreign and local creditors.’ i 
VIII. Post-EDSA Reform politics 
Post-EDSA literature is developed foremost in 
Benedict Anderson’s Cacique Democracy in the Philippines: 
Origins and Dreams published in the New Left Review (1988:3-
33). This period commenced with the melodramatic scene 
where Corazon Cojuangco Aquino returned to the Philippines, 
widower of Senator Binigno Aquino Sr., and administered the 
burial of her husband.   
News stories and other documentary evidence show 
that the poignant scene generated an outpouring of sympathy 
from people from all walks of life for the widow of the fallen 
martyr.  The yellow ribbon, black pins and the statement, 
“Hindi ka nag-iisa” (“You are not alone”), became a byword of 
sympathy for Senator Benigno Aquino, who was murdered 
upon return to the country.  
Media institutions such as the Philippine Daily 
Inquirer, reported on formation of movements, coalitions— 
such as the Justice for All, Justice for Aquino (JAJA) 
movement, the August Twenty One Movement (ATOM),  
Citizens for Human Rights and Social Transformation 
(CHRIST), Citizens of Las Piňas for Aquino and Democracy 
(CLAD), Muslim  Organization for Solidarity, Equality for the 
Masses (MOSLEM), United for President’s Ouster (UPO), 
Kilusan para sa Kapangyarihan at Karapatan ng Bayan 
(KAAKBAY), Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (BAYAN),  the 
Bayang Nagkaisa sa Diwa at Layunin (BANDILA). 
The dictator Marcos was besieged by massive national 
movements calling for his ouster.  The Aquino murder was 
aggravated by the worsening economic condition, plus the 
series of military atrocities, such as the Escalante Massacre, the 
Bombing at Ipil in the Zamboanga peninsula, and others.   
The people believed Marcos had lost his mandate to 
lead the country. To validate and legitimize his unpopular stay 
in power, he ordered the holding of a snap election. But 
traditional politicians joined the cause-oriented groups in their 
campaign to boycott any of Marcos’ elections.  
On February 7, 1986, a snap election was held. Many 
sectors moved and called for the widening of democratic space 
via elections. Suspicion were rife, that the Marcos 
administration was out to cheat in order to ensure his electoral 
victory. Some teachers reported that supervisors had asked 
them to choose Marcos in exchange for money.  
The Social Security System (SSS) employees, in fact, 
had to work overtime to insert money into envelopes that bear 
a print “Office of the President.” Barangay officials were also 
used to distribute these envelpes in exchange for votes for 
Marcos. And as expected, government personnel were used to 
mobilize in their dirty strategy. In a way, the CPP and the 
movement BAYAN were right in their projection that Marcos 
would not allow Cory to win the elections (Guerrero 2005; 
Constantino 1979). 
Amid the waves of people’s protests a group of young 
AFP personnel, who were disillusioned with the Marcos 
regime, organized themselves into a group called,  “We Belong 
Movement” (WBM). The organization was formed in the wake 
of the demoralization of some AFP, members who realized that 
the AFP earned the notoriety of being Marcos’ private army, 
favoured only generals who are close to Marcos allies.  
Moreover, the slow pace of promotion and the loss of credibility 
of the AFP hastened the formation of the military movements.  
Gaining strength the WBM later changed its name to what was 
later popularly known as the Reform the AFP Movement 
(RAM) that became so active in the 1986 elections (Anderson 
1998). 
The popular uprising that toppled the Marcos regime 
in 1986 is named after the place in Metro-Manila where people 
power was born. The middle class forces which dominated what 
is now known as the EDSA I uprising, the appeal to a 
democratic reform politics, and the adherence of a substantial 
number of the Filipino people to its anti-corruption agenda, is 
still considered the turning point in the emergence of reform 
politicians as legitimate, new-type politicians that deserve the 
respect and trust of the electorate.  
While the first EDSA uprising was going on, the elite 
was busy finding means to consolidate its control over political 
power.  On the other hand, it could have been a chance for the 
national democratic movement to find its way this time in the 
mainstream political arena.  However, it had chosen to boycott 
the elections leaving itself to the cold. Some people disregarded 
the movement and made their own way to the positions of 
power too. 
As a result, a section of the elite, wrested control of the 
government.  They were the ones that Marcos had 
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disenfranchised during his dictatorship. They were able to 
regain their stake holdings and other assets went back to big old 
business, disregarding the left and its role in previous collective 
efforts in coalitions. Classic examples are the properties of the 
Lopez’,  such as the ABS-CBN and MERALCO. Years later, 
the Marcos’ circles and even the members of Marcos’ family 
were back to office.   
The discourse on ‘people power’ or EDSA I shows 
how this new-type politicians, most of whom were tempered in 
the struggle against the Marcos dictatorship, had acquired some 
level of ascendancy in Philippine politics. Despite their broad-
based appeal, the political ascendancy of reform politicians did 
not result in massive political and structural change in the era.  
As an event that triggered political settlements, EDSA 
I, might have expanded the space for participation by politicians 
of non-traditional types and stripes. However, most of the 
renowned political icons of the era also came from the same 
trapo families who were disadvantaged by the Marcos 
dictatorship. In many ways, these politicians were able to regain 
their political ascendancy under the administration of President 
Corazon Aquino after EDSA I.  
The much wider democratic space in the realm of 
political participation during this period was characterized by 
ambiguity and inconsistency. While it spoke of reforms and 
ideals of political change, the Cory Aquino government did not 
hide its ambivalence on crucial social justice issues such as 
agrarian reform, particularly in the contested lands of the 
Cojuangco-Aquino owned Hacienda Luisita sugar estate.  
The succeeding post-EDSA administrations, with the 
political elites still at the helm, allowed the US bases to pack up 
from the Clark airfield and the Subic naval-base. This is 
evidenced by the fact that the State sustained the Mutual 
Defense Treaty (MDT) of 1951 and accommodated the entry of 
the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) in 1997. 
PCJJ’s comprehensive work on corruption in the 
Philippines with contributors/authors such as Isagani de Castro 
(1998), Shiela Coronel (1998), Earl Parreňo (1998), and Ellen 
Tordesillas (1998) maps out where national politics is skewed. 
PCJJ’s work, says using public money for political campaigns 
was en vogue in the Marcos regime but it was not stopped 
despite stringent measures after 1986 (Isagani de Castro 1998).   
Congress controls millions of money for “pork barrel” 
funds that only ended up in projects that have not impacted on 
the lives of the poor (Parreño 1998). Government was also 
involved in dubious deals like the famous Amari Land Scam 
(Tordesillas and Coronel 1998), or  business monopoly 
(Coronel 1998:112-149).  
 The only consolation during this period was President 
Cory Aquino’s wider consultative form of engagement that she 
provided for other social classes to participate in. Political 
settlement here was seen in the Cory government’s 
accommodation of retired military generals in public office, and 
the growing number of petty entrepreneurial classes, 
entertainment industry personalities, media personalities, and a 
number of moderate social activists at the helm of government 
service.   
 The Ramos administration that ensued, towed the 
same line as the Cory Aquino’s developmentalist agenda in his 
NICHOOD Philippines 2000. However, the same cultivates on 
the assembly line in a Fordist international industrialization, 
such as the case of Cebu’s Western Seaboard’s ship building 
and ship breaking industries, that sacrificed basic sectors in 
coastal communities of Western Cebu province, Toledo City, 
Balamban, Asturias towns (Sanchez 2005; Sanchez 1997).  
Estrada sustained the same in his “Angat Pinoy” 
agenda but only to expand our foreign debts. This was followed 
by Arroyo’s “Super Regions” in the “The Arrangkada 
Philippines Project” under the auspices of the American 
Chamber of Commerce (AMCHAM) that pushed for 471 policy 
recommendations. And the latest is the Aquino Regime’s 
“Inclusive Growth” with the Joint Foreign Chambers of 
Commerce (JFCC) signing up the Transpacific Partnership 
Agreement (TPPA) hoping to boost the economy via tourism 
and a more neo-liberal economic framework of development in 
the country.  
Contemporary regimes, however, sustain the same 
aggressiveness in pushing for neo-liberal developmentalism or 
that foreign investments led economy, despite informed threats 
and the experience of economic down turn in the Marcos 
regime.  
Syncretic forms of Political Institutions 
On the other hand, EDSA 1 is considered the pivotal 
force in the emergence of reform politicians as  new-type 
politicians in the country.  These new-type politicians may have 
gained some level of  ascendancy in Philippine politics but their 
political ascendancy is not of a kind that effects massive 
political and structural change in the era.  As an event that 
triggered political settlements, EDSA I might have expanded 
the space for political participation by politicians of non-
traditional types and stripes. But there were also some trapo 
families, who lost their powerful political positions in the 
Marcos dictatorship, were able to regain their political 
ascendancy under the administration of President Corazon 
Aquino after EDSA I.  
The much wider democratic space in the realm of 
political participation during this period was characterized by 
ambiguity and inconsistency. While it spoke of reforms and 
ideals of political change, the Cory administration  did not hide 
the ambivalent position on matters of  genuine assets 
redistribution, particularly in the contested lands such as that of 
Hacienda Luisita.  In some instances, however, it was said to 
have dampened the feudal practices of the landed oligarchs 
what with the introduction of new programs for land and 
agrarian reform. The succeeding post-EDSA administrations, 
with the Janus-faced political elites still at the helm, allowed the 
US bases to pack up from the Clark airfield and the Subic naval-
base, but at the same time it showed unqualified acceptance of 
American intervention in the political affairs of the state. This 
is evidenced by the fact that the State sustained the Mutual 
Defense Treaty (MDT) of 1951 and accommodated the entry of 
the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) in 1997. 
Using public money for political campaigns was en 
vogue in the Marcos regime but it was not stopped despite 
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stringent measures after 1986 (Isagani de Castro 1998).  
Congress controls millions of money for “pork barrel” funds 
that only ended up in projects that have not impacted on the 
lives of the poor (Parreňo, Earl 1998). Government was also 
involved in dubious deals like the famous Amari Land Scam 
(Tordesillas and Coronel 1998 ), or  business monopoly 
(Coronel 1998: 112-149).  The only consolation  during this 
period was President Cory Aquino’s wider consultative form of 
engagement that she provided for other social classes to 
participate in.  Political settlement here was seen in the Cory 
government’s accommodation of retired military generals in 
public office, and the growing number of petty entrepreneurial 
classes, entertainment industry personalities, media 
personalities, and a number of  moderate social activists at the 
helm of  government service.   
In retrospect democratic transition can also be 
revisited from historical perspective in  the “Limang 
Kapanahunan ng Pamumunong Bayan sa Kasaysayan ng 
Pilipinas” by  historian Zeus Salazar (1997) that shows that  
transformation of leadership categories was due to the mixing 
and interchange of native categories with foreign and colonial 
categories from the time of Spanish intervention until after the 
time of the Katipunan revolution of 1896.  Salazar (1997) 
argues that strands of old colonial politics overlap with the 
emerging new native politics with its distinctive reoriented 
tasks and functions, and new leadership ideologies.  
Furthermore, it shows how the emerging native politics 
accommodate resistance oriented leaders of the former anti-
Marcos movements within the same social field of politics.   
Salazar’s (1997) periodization and categorization of 
sources of leadership and orientation suggest a kind of heuristic 
framework for understanding the political development of the 
Philippines according to the following premises: a.) Mga uri o 
kategoriya ng pamumuno (Types and categories of leadership); 
b.) Gawain o tungkulin ng pamumuno (Tasks and obligations 
of leaders); c.) Pinagmumulan o pinaghahanguan ng 
pamumuno (Origins and sources of leadership);  d.) Mga 
katangian ng pamumuno (Characteristics of leadership); e.) 
Ideolohiya o sumasaklaw at pinaiiral na kaisipan o tunguhin ng  
pamunuan (Ideology or  overarching principles and approaches 
of leadership); f.) Wika at samakatuwid kultura ng pamumuno 
(Spoken language or the delineated leadership culture);  and g.) 
Pagkakaroon at kawalan ng kasarinlan o maipagmamalaking 
kakanyahan ng pamunuan (Notion of what could advance a 
sovereignty and/or what could lead to the loss of one’s 
sovereignty and/or credibility as a leader.) 
Salazar also establishes proofs of the evolution of the 
native Filipino political structure and culture according to the 
framework: a.) Saligang institusyon sa pag-umpisa (Basic 
political institutions such as the four pillars of leadership in the 
country: of the Datu, Babaylan, Panday and Bagani);  b.)  
Pagkahubog (Formation);  and c.) Pagkabuo ng lipunan at 
Pulitikang Pilipino (The Formation of Philippine Society and 
Politics.)  
His periodization of the historical development of 
Filipino politics and culture is premised on the following: a.) 
Dating pamumuno (bago 1565) (Old political leadership prior 
to 1565);  b.)  Pamumunong Pinoy sa panahong kolonyal (1565-
1815) (Filipino leadership in Colonial Times, 1565-1815); c.) 
Pamumunong Pinoy bago ang rebelyon, (1815-1896) (Filipino 
leadership prior to the rebellion, 1815-1896); d.) Panahon ng 
Rebelyon (1896-1913) (Leadership during the rebellion, 1896-
1913);  e.) Kasalukuyan (1913-1996) 
   (Contemporary period, 1913 -1996).  
Hence, it is observed that not all transitions from one 
period of administration to another always coincide with the 
opposite direction such as a realignment from feudal absolutist 
institutions to that of a democratic and commercial economic 
institutions. In fact the Latin American feudal and agricultural 
institutions  transformed into caudilla, populist and neo-
colonized states in the case of most Latin America. Perhaps, 
from Salazar’s (1997) work, one can theorize further what 
better framework could be used to understand the processes of 
transition in the Philippines from some kind of sultanistic 
administration in both national and sub-national levels such as 
that starting from a Marcosian era to the more recent ones in 
Philippine political history.  Meanwhile, looking back to Sidel’s 
patrimonialism, one can find  resonance in Linz and Stepan’s 
(1996) sultanistic regimes where all individuals, groups and 
institutions are permanent subjects to  unpredictable and 
despotic interventions of an authority they call sultanistic. In 
sultanism all pluralisms are considered precarious where 
traditional domination by means of  military force is used as 
instrument for dictatorship.  However, in the Philippines, the 
years following the first EDSA revolution were also the years 
when paramilitary groups were effectively used as state 
apparatus to stifle democratic dissent in the guise of preserving 
internal security and “peace” keeping.  In fact, the existence of 
the Citizens Armed Force Geographical Unit (CAFGU) has 
been sustained all over the country from its inception to the 
present.  
Classic Case of Reform-Type Political Settlement: Robredo 
Style 
Political settlement may also appear in such norm as 
one that balances social interests of various political groups or 
entities that are non-patrimonial  but  service-oriented 
alternative structures of formal and semi-formal networks.  
These are proven to be effective political settlement 
organizations as shown in Kawanaka’s (1996) work on the 
"Robredo" leadership style.  From being an ordinary worker in 
San Miguel Corporation (SMC), Robredo left his corporate job 
to pursue the Bicol River Basin Development Program 
(BRBDP) (Isaac and Aceron, 2007 pp. 7-47 in Medel-Lopez 
Gonzalez, 2007).  He first became famous for the success of this 
project. As alternative political institution, Robredo’s 
alternative organizations were remarkable for being egalitarian, 
rather than feudal, in character.  Rather than promoting patron-
client relationships, the political machine and bossism of old, 
these groups replicated mass organizations  functioning  as 
democratic political structures for that encouraged extensive 
people’s participation in governance. 
  His exposure to the private organizations under the 
BRBDP hugely contributed to his stint as an exemplary public 
servant.  His output oriented-NGO technocracy, combined with 
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his corporate skills, blended into his management style in the 
Naga City LGU.  His expertise enabled him to realign various 
sectors on board, realizing development programs in the city via  
people-oriented development direction.  He was later 
recognized for initiating the following projects while in public 
office:  a.) Mass housing for poor informal settlers in Naga City; 
b.) “improved basic social services for the city”; c.) anti graft 
and corrupt practices campaign activities; d.) drawing 
thousands of constituents to participate in his regular conduct 
of civic action series with the different sectors of the 
community; e.) formation of city councils and accreditation of 
POs and NGOs as partners in governance; f.)  giving emphasis 
to the poor as a priority in his “Kaantabay sa Kauswagan 
Program”  (Partners in Development Program); g.) Raising the 
level of performance, productivity and morale among city 
employees; h.) initiating strike movements against patronage 
politics in Naga City (Pabico 2007; Legazpi 2005: 35-52; Isaac 
and Aceron 2007: 7-47). 
An effective type of political settlement is seen in 
Robredo’s participatory LGU management mechanisms as 
shown by the following: a.) the unity of the constituents of Naga 
City who support his governance and the LGU’s  support for 
the constituents  through social services; b.) His participatory 
governance that was open to the involvement of all stakeholders 
in the tasks of city hall; c.) the importance of mutual trust; d.) 
the effectivity of decentralized governance coupled with 
regularity and seriousness of performance reviews and 
feedback mechanisms among employees; and e.) the effectivity 
of “empowerment ordinances that authorize citizens to become 
involved in the city policy formulation, where constituents are 
entitled to participate in  welfare organizations and city hall 
committee meetings” (Legazpi 2005: 34-52;  Isaac and Aceron 
2007: 7-47.)  
Ironically, however, the overwhelming popular 
support for  Robredo’s leadership and  management at one time  
had virtually reduced the democratic political structure of Naga 
City to a one party system.  As no one dared to run against 
Robredo, whose popularity and political leadership in Naga 
City was unmatched by any politicians, his political party stood 
unbeatable in the elections during his stint as mayor in the city.  
In an interview with the researcher, Mayor Robredo revealed 
that in the last three elections prior to his stint as DILG 
secretary, he was unopposed in the local elections.  
When he died as Secretary of the Interior and Local 
Governments (DILG), Robredo was extolled for his “Tsinelas 
Brand of Leadership”.  People grieved over his death.  He died 
leaving a legacy of excellence in public service and  his 
“management by example” for people to remember him by. He 
was admired for reporting to office early in the day with his 
casual workman’s clothes to put other employees and the public 
at ease before him, and for his pursuance of a merit-based hiring 
and promotion system in public office. 
In Statist framework, Kawanaka, Takeshi (2002) 
Power in a Philippine City, Tokyo:  Institute of Developing 
Studies, looks at Robredo’s case by asking the following sets of 
questions: How do local political leaders who emphasize good 
governance manage to maintain local power? How do local 
political leaders affect the formation of important political 
institutions? How have periodic changes in central-local 
relations affected the nature of local power, and why have these 
changes occurred? Do good governance initiatives affect the 
salience of the political machine? How similar would the 
findings be if the theoretical framework is applied in a more 
rural setting? 
Distinctive from other studies, Kawanaka, focused on 
the case of Mayor Jesse Robredo of Naga City who is a reform 
politician, unlike previous studies in examining how state 
shapes local politics, utilized case studies of local “strongmen”, 
“warlords” and “bosses” and focused on the use of illegal 
economic activities and political violence as mechanism for 
maintaining local power and control.  
The study accounts here how Robredo appropriated 
his political machine to good use in the manner he conducts 
public office emphasizing the redistributive welfare capacity of 
the LGU as a state institution.  Significantly, Kawanaka in this 
work explains the parallel existence of good governance and 
political machines in local politics and provokes questions that 
are important to understanding Philippine local politics. 
As opposed to the sociocultural framework, that 
identifies kinship patterns, social relationships and traditional 
values that reinforce the patron-client system, as crucial in 
explaining the nature of local politics,  Kawanaka uses statism 
as his framework of analysis, by looking at the two important 
realities neglected by the socio-cultural perspectives, which are: 
a.) competition among political leaders in gaining access to the 
state’s resources, and b.) the role of institutions that define how 
the state’s resources are allocated.   
This statist framing sought to present an alternative 
explanation of how local power is obtained and maintained.  In 
the objectives of Kawanaka’s study, he articulated that he 
sought “to present a different type of local politician from that 
of the warlord type, and to refute the image of Philippine local 
politics as filled with violence and illegal activities” (p. 19).   
Kawanaka found out that monopoly on the control of 
state resources and the effective distribution of these resources 
are the important factors in maintaining local power, rather than 
cultural values, patron client relationship and personal wealth, 
as argued by the sociocultural perspective. It asserts that the 
socioeconomic condition in a locality is an important contextual 
variable, since the manner in which state resources are 
channelled to meet the interests of local citizens differ across 
the landscape and across socioeconomic classes. 
Likewise, Kawanaka established that the reasons for 
competing in public office, are as follows: a.) because state 
office provides access to resources such as finance, credit 
allocation, regulatory power, employment in the public sector, 
physical coercive power through the police, and b.) because 
being a part of a state institution enables access to state 
resources which maybe allocated and utilized, such as the 
electoral system, the framework of central-local relations, and 
the spoils system in civil service appointments 
Significantly, Kawanaka’s work proved a hybridized  
appropriation of  machine politics, where political machines 
does not result in the systematic plunder of state resources as 
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other studies have depicted Philippine politics as characteristic 
of a “predatory state”.  Hence, in the case of Naga City where 
the urban poor are concerned about assets redistribution 
(through housing, livelihood, and other such programmes), it 
was also found out that other social classes, such as the middle 
class continues to support Robredo because his good service 
results in the delivery of important assets such as development 
infrastructures.  In Kawanaka, these are considered as both 
divisible and indivisible benefits reallocated for the everyday 
life of the constituency.  
Here, literature would point to the practice of reform 
politics based on participatory governance mixed with a norm 
of communalism of old, a practice that  resonated from the 
native notion of “pamiminunong pampamayanan” rather than 
that of the colonially oriented rational-legal bureaucracy. What 
makes the Robredo leadership style a novelty was the way he 
led or managed a city with deep respect and his collegiality with 
poor folks in his LGU, unlike other city mayors who would 
rather be insulated from the rest of the people. This shows us 
that in order for good governance to work and to succeed, a 
mixture of old communal norm is needed in the practice of 
leadership and development in a city.     
Literature on local reform politics, however, provides 
the researcher a dearth of data based on the minimal incidence 
of the emergence of reform politicians in the field.  Much of 
these experiences are merely based on development reports of 
fragmented initiatives from different individuals, sectors and 
institutions.  Consolidation of these observations into a body of 
scientific literature is yet to be established to make for a 
consistent body of knowledge. 
The Party List System   
A new-type political norm also comes with the entry 
of the party  list system (PLS) in Philippine politics,  
introducing such changes in political practice as proportional 
representation through voting of parties or of voting based on 
program platforms rather than personalities.  These modes of 
representative politics are provided in the policy declaration of 
Republic Act (RA) 7941 or the Party List System (PLS) Act 
that says:   
The State shall promote proportional 
representation in the election of 
representatives to the House of 
Representatives through a party-list system 
of registered national, regional and sectoral 
parties or organizations, or coalitions 
thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens 
belonging to the marginalized and 
underrepresented sectors, organizations and 
parties, and who lack well-defined political 
constituencies but who could contribute to 
the formulation and enactment of 
appropriate legislation that will benefit the 
nation as a whole, to become members of the 
House of Representatives.   
     Somewhat analogous to the Tzarist accommodation of the 
Duma in the history of Russian authoritarianism, sectoral 
representation was first introduced to the Philippines during the 
Marcos dictatorship through the institutionalization of the 
corporatist system. In this system, every sector was to be 
represented by organization approved and controlled by Marcos 
himself (KASARINLAN, August 10, 2004, PROCEEDINGS, 
Policy Dialogue Series 2004: Academe Meets the Party-List 
Representatives p. 5-18).   Unfortunately, however, it turned out 
that most, if not all of sectoral representatives  at the time,  were 
either labor bureaucrats from the Trade Union Congress of the 
Philippines (TUCP), fake peasants, or individuals who had 
never had any recognizable relationships to sectors they were 
supposed to represent (Ibid.).  
In the Party List law there were similar progressive 
provisions that include a.) the granting of absentee voting rights 
to Filipino citizens abroad (Article V, Sec. 2); b.) the election 
of sectoral representatives (Artcile X, Sec. 9); and c.) the 
prohibition of political dynasties (Article II, Sec. 26).  These 
were resolutions made in EDSA 1 in 1986 that were 
incorporated in the Philippine Constitution as part of the move 
toward the democratization of Philippine society (Ibid.). These 
provisions offer hope for transformation of the trapo system via 
the more programatic parties that are more responsive to needs 
of the marginalized majority of Filipinos.  The party list system 
is envisioned to respond to calls for genuine representation for 
marginalized masses in the legislature. The partylist system 
calls for proportional representation through the party list ballot 
while it focuses attention on the party and not on personalities, 
thus  rendering the names of candidates meaningless and 
thereby reducing money politics (Wurfel 1997).  
Parallel to the party list system is the practice electing 
or appointing local leaders who became LGU officials on the 
bases of their historically active participation in people’s 
organizations that were radically pursuing issues affecting poor 
and marginalized sectors.  
 
IX. Conclusion 
 This part of the survey of literature helps establish 
patterns of roles of Filipino strong institutions, and the social 
foundations of their growth by answering the question, where 
these institutions and social relations came from in the first 
place. Also the role of more distal sources versus proximate 
causes (in historical context); questions of sequencing and path 
dependence; and issues of case selection and causal inferences 
were scrutinized to draw on how reform politics had situated 
itself over the course of time.  
Nation building in Philippine context, resonates from 
the long and extensive history of resistance against colonial to 
a neo-colonial political order.  
Turning points for reforms commenced with the 
concepts of the formation of a Filipino nation that took off from 
a series of nativistic revolts as the immediate form of resistance 
against Spanish foreign intrusion. Nativism is resistance against 
the new order as it pushes forth a need to return to the native 
life-world. But with the kind of colonial brutalities committed 
by Spain against the Filipino natives in ancient times, who 
would not think to stand and fight back to preserve one’s race?  
Statistics has it that not less than two uprisings 
happened in a year and that more than 25 uprisings had taken 
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place prior to 1745. In 1745 up to the 19th century, the series of 
resistance took the shape of fighting for assets reforms, assets 
redistribution and on top of everything it calls for national 
freedoms. 
A series of democratic transitions has been scattered 
all over Philippine political history since colonial times. This is 
evidenced by a legacy of a series of uprisings in the early 
movements for change.  
Among the forms of resistance that serve as 
revolutionary tradition of the Filipino people are popular 
uprisings. Popular uprisings were common themes that 
characterize the Filipino resistance movement in both Spanish 
and American colonial times.  
The popular uprisings were later followed by the 
Catholic Church’s secularization movement pushing for native 
clergy to handle parishes as a rightful trajectory rooted from the 
original Episcopal missions. However, three Filipino priests, 
the Fathers Mariano Gomez, Jose Burgos and Jacinto Zamora 
were executed in February 17, 1872 for charges of rebellion as 
they were implicated to the Cavite mutiny. The martyrdom of 
thepriests inspired the reform and propaganda movement that 
called for representation in the Spanish cortes, freedom of the 
press and a massive anti-friar sentiment.  As it escalated, the 
more aggressive call for severing of ties with Spain peaked with 
nationalist Katipunan Revolution. 
The historical controversy on how the Filipino 
revolutionary leaders were duped to have to wait for another 
independence day to be granted by another colonial power, 
sustains our nation-building efforts into another level of 
struggles demanding a more sturdy foundation for nation-
building.   
For this time, we have to face the problems of a neo-
colonial order. After the Japanese war in 1946, a third republic 
was inaugurated and various economic and foreign policies 
were engaged from Roxas, Quirino, Magsaysay, Garcia, 
Macapagal to the Marcos dictatorship, now shaping what could 
be the basis of Philippine political structure and culture and that 
of the emergence of reform politics. 
  However, early on, what is in place is said to be a 
preponderance of political families in dyadic factions. These 
political families regularly come from among the wealthy and 
rich residents of the community. Hence, the household is 
attached to a system of patronage where politics thrive via 
systems of protection and support in feudal schemes where 
favors are exchanged for votes and political support.   
These are true to families that breed the Principalia 
class of land-owning and prominent clan. It is also the same 
class that breeds the politically influential Ilustrado or native 
educated elite class. 
Salazar (1997) sums up the transitions from a 
historical perspective, where significant political 
transformation occurred through the mix and interchange of 
native leadership categories with that of foreign and colonial 
categories from Spanish times to the more contemporary 
period.   
Salazar (1997) argues that old politics overlap with 
new emerging politics in distinctive reoriented tasks and 
functions, and new ideologies of leadership.  He posits that 
emerging native politics has a mix of orientation from the 
resistance movement of Spanish times; the pre-war (Japanese-
American); post-war; and after Marcos period.  
Anderson elaborated on cacique democracy that is a 
result of the institutionalization of the rule of law, “elections,” 
political parties and factions. Along with this is also the politics 
of turn-coats and deserters, where there are no permanent allies 
and permanent enemies. 
The major sources of reform politics was traced to the 
historical unfolding of political leadership and their handling of 
US interventions, right after WWII or the Third Philippine 
Republic, from the term of President Roxas, Quirino, 
Magsaysay, Garcia, Macapagal and the dictatorship of 
President Marcos. 
The major influences that has affected the 
administration of the state include among others US economic 
and military policies such as the Bell Trade Act, The Laurel 
Langley Agreement, the US-Military Bases Agreement, the 
Mutual Defense Treaty, and the Martial Law.  
The rise of a dictator in Philippine political history 
introduced such literature as the abolition of the legislative body 
and constitutional authoritarianism, making the position of the 
president one with that of a prime minister, and where the 
presidential form of government was transformed into a 
parliamentary one.  
  Summary executions, torture, disappearance and other 
massive forms of human rights violations became part of the 
experience. Various forms of organizations, from people’s 
organizations (POs), alliances, coalitions and many others were 
used as channels of protests against the abusive conditions 
under a dictatorship.  
In more recent development, the case of the leadership 
style of former DILG Secretary Jesse Robredo was considered 
a reform ideal type of politician.  He realized development for 
the poor sectors in the city where they come from.  He 
exemplified LGU management through his inclusive political 
settlements with poor sectors in the LGU where he served for 
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